5300 core years: 1 year of 5300 CPU cores running at 100% load

5300 core years can even run in a few seconds if you have a lot of cores (~ 1,67*10^11) đź™‚

]]>What I want to understand is how long 5300 core years takes in practice? Depending on the machines we use. I always see this core years numbers thrown around but never really understand them đź™‚

]]>I’m looking at Table 4, and it talks about the num of bits p needs for a certain security level with or without ignoring constants.

For example it says for BN curves with n=12, when not ignoring constants, 256 bits in p is enough for 128 bit security.

Isn’t *that* the relevant number?

Why also write the number that ignores the constants? ]]>

Your precision about the practical security implications for breaking Baretto-Naehrig curves in very valuable for people who are more users than creators/cryptanalysts of these curves.

We thought in the past that the crossover point of the best attacks for BN curves (with embedded degree 12) was for curves around 256 bits, thus providing a security level of 128 bits.

You now consider that the best attack has a complexity around 96 bits instead of 128 bits.

I understand that it’s difficult to provide precise numbers, but if we want to reconsider the actual estimated crossover of the best attacks on BN curves, what would be the actual size of the curves which cannot be broken with an attack better than the canonical ones ?

Would it be around 192 bits curves (96 bits security level) ? 160 ? 128 ? 112 ?

Even if 256 bits BN curve become obsolete, smaller curves may still provide interesting benefits for lesser security use cases… ]]>

It may be worth clarifying that this is “contrary to” the original Sarkarâ€“Singh method. If I understand correctly, the Sarkarâ€“Singh method combined with Kimâ€“Barbulescu does give an asymptotic improvement, and is currently the best algorithm. (I’m assuming it can be applied to the “special extended” case as well.)

Zcash (https://z.cash) had been planning to use a BN128 curve, and we’re currently trying to reassess what curve we will need in light of this attack: https://github.com/zcash/zcash/issues/714

]]>